

The Trust Infrastructure

Defending the information commons and earning public confidence in the age of synthetic media

PREPARED FOR JOURNALISTS · EDUCATORS · PLATFORM POLICY TEAMS · CIVIL SOCIETY



FAIR Labs

FAIR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH LABS

July 2026
FL-2026-09

The Trust Infrastructure: Defending the information commons and earning public confidence in the age of synthetic media

The ninth volume of the Frontier Series confronts the moment when convincing text, images, audio, and video can be fabricated at near-zero cost. Its central claim: societies need trust the way cities need water — as engineered infrastructure, not ambient good fortune. The report anatomizes the twin failure modes of gullibility and reflexive disbelief, designs a four-layer trust stack from provenance rails to a literate public, assesses what authentication can and cannot do, and assigns duties to the institutions whose vouching still holds.

REPORT CODE	FL-2026-09
PUBLICATION DATE	July 2026
PRIMARY AUDIENCES	Journalists · Educators · Platform Policy Teams · Civil Society
SERIES	FAIR Labs Frontier Series, Fair Artificial Intelligence Research Labs
SUGGESTED CITATION	<i>The Trust Infrastructure: Defending the information commons and earning public confidence in the age of synthetic media.</i> FAIR Labs Frontier Series, Vol. 09. Fair Artificial Intelligence Research Labs, 2026.
KEYWORDS	epistemic security, synthetic media, provenance, misinformation, public trust, AI literacy, institutions

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IN BRIEF · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Reality is getting cheap to counterfeit. Trust must become engineered infrastructure.

When convincing text, voices, images, and video can be produced for fractions of a cent, the question is no longer whether fabrication happens but what everything else stands on. Societies have faced this class of problem before — with money, with food safety, with drinking water — and solved it the same way each time: not by asking citizens to inspect everything themselves, but by building infrastructure that makes the trustworthy thing the default thing. Information needs its waterworks. This report is the engineering brief.

01 The scissors have opened.

The cost of fabricating convincing content collapsed toward zero while the cost of checking an unprovenanced artifact stayed stubbornly human. Any defense that prices verification per item loses to an attacker who prices fabrication per thousand.

02 The liar's dividend cuts deeper than the lie.

Synthetic media's gravest harm is not that fakes are believed — it is that real evidence becomes deniable. "That could be AI" is now a universal solvent for accountability, and it works without a single fake being made.

03 Detection alone loses the arms race.

Detectors chase artifacts that each model generation erases. The durable move is the opposite one: stop trying to prove the fake is fake, and make it easy to prove the real is real — authentication over detection.

04 Trust is a stack, not a switch.

Provenance rails, platforms, professional verifiers, and a literate public form four layers of defense. Each is leaky; none suffices alone; together they can hold. Epistemic security is defense in depth, like every other security.

05 Institutions must become authenticated channels.

Statistics agencies, courts, newsrooms, science, and archives are the load-bearing verifiers. Their new duty is to make their outputs cryptographically checkable — and their opportunity is that vouching becomes scarce, therefore valuable.

06 Design for a capable public, not a managed one.

Epistemic literacy works like inoculation: small doses of manipulation, examined openly, confer resistance. Treating citizens as fragile invites both censorship and cynicism. Treating them as capable is not idealism — it is the only design that scales.

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01

The epistemic shock

Every society runs on a quiet assumption: that producing convincing evidence of things that never happened is expensive. That assumption priced our defaults — seeing is believing, the tape settles it, the document proves it. The price just changed.

Three shifts arrived together. The first is **marginal cost**. Generating fluent text, cloned voices, photorealistic images, and increasingly convincing video now costs fractions of a cent per artifact and requires no skill beyond typing a request. Fabrication used to be a craft; forgeries were rationed by the effort they took. That rationing — never a principle, just a fact about tools — did more work holding the information environment together than anyone appreciated while it lasted.

The second shift is **personalization at scale**. Mass propaganda was a broadcast problem: one message, many receivers, visible to its critics. Generative systems make persuasion a retail product — the pitch tuned to one person's fears, dialect, and doomscroll, delivered in private, invisible to fact-checkers because no two people see the same artifact. The unit of manipulation has shrunk from the population to the individual, and defenses built for broadcast do not automatically transfer.

The third shift is **volume against attention**. Human attention is fixed; synthetic supply is not. Even if the average fabrication persuades no one, flooding the zone imposes a tax on every reader's remaining confidence — the cumulative "is this real?" overhead that makes people first tired, then cynical, then disengaged. Exhaustion, not deception, may be the shock's most efficient product.

WHY "COMMONS" IS THE RIGHT FRAME

Shared reality behaves like a classic commons: everyone draws on it (evidence works, denial is bounded, strangers can transact), no one owns it, and it degrades through individually rational overuse. Every actor who profits from one synthetic deception — commercial, political, or petty — spends down a stock of default trust that no single actor can replenish. Commons problems have known solutions, and they are never "ask individuals to be more careful." They are infrastructure, institutions, and norms — the three materials this report builds with.

Notice what this framing refuses. It refuses nostalgia: the pre-synthetic information environment was not a golden age, and gatekeepers failed often enough that public skepticism about them is earned. It refuses panic: societies absorbed the printing press, the photograph, and the darkroom-composite, each of which contemporaries declared fatal to truth. And it refuses complacency, because this transition really is different in one measurable way — the scissors of Chapter 2, a cost inversion none of the earlier shocks produced. The capability–assurance gap that Volume 01 tracks at the frontier has a civic twin: our capacity to generate claims has industrialized, while our capacity to check them is still artisanal. Closing civic gaps is slower than closing technical ones. That is the argument for starting now.

02

The liar's dividend and the doubter's trap

A society can fail epistemically in two opposite directions: by believing too easily, and by refusing to believe at all. The second failure is quieter, more corrosive, and — this is the uncomfortable part — the one synthetic media rewards most.

The obvious failure mode is **gullibility**: fakes believed, scams completed, reputations wrecked by counterfeit evidence. It is real, it is growing, and it is at least partially self-correcting — people burned by fakes learn caution, and caution spreads. The deeper failure mode runs the other way. Once everyone knows convincing fabrication is possible, *authentic* evidence loses its power to settle anything. The recorded confession, the leaked memo, the atrocity footage — each can now be met with a shrug: "probably AI." Scholars named this the **liar's dividend**: the benefit that accrues to the dishonest simply because fakes are known to exist. The dividend is paid without a single fake being made, and it compounds — every publicized deepfake makes the next denial more plausible.

≈0

marginal cost of a convincing fabrication — the number that broke the old defaults (stylized)

2


failure modes to defend against at once — belief in the false, and denial of the true

4

layers in the trust stack this report proposes — because no single layer survives contact alone

Gullibility and reflexive disbelief are not opposites in practice; they are stages. The citizen who cannot tell what is real does not become a careful Bayesian — she becomes a tribal epistemologist, believing whatever her side asserts and dismissing whatever it denies, because group trust is the only heuristic that still feels reliable. Call it the **doubter's trap**: universal skepticism collapses into selective credulity. The endpoint of "trust nothing" is not rigor. It is "trust us."

EXHIBIT 9.1 • STYLIZED

The scissors: fabrication got industrial while verification stayed artisanal

Stylized rendering of the report's cost argument; axes are relative, not measured. The fabrication curve reflects the collapse in effort per convincing artifact; the verification curve reflects the persistently human cost of checking an item that carries no provenance. The shaded wedge is the structural subsidy to dishonesty that infrastructure must remove.

The scissors explain why the intuitive response — build better fake-detectors — cannot carry the load alone. Detection is an arms race run on the defender's worst terrain: each model generation erases the artifacts the last generation of detectors keyed on; a detector that is even occasionally wrong in both directions becomes a weapon (false "AI-generated" verdicts are themselves a liar's dividend); and detection prices verification per item, which is exactly the economics the attacker already won. Detectors remain useful — as triage, as friction, as forensics — but they are a rearguard.

THE PIVOT THIS REPORT ARGUES FOR

Stop organizing the defense around proving the fake is fake. Organize it around making the real easy to prove real. Authentication scales where detection cannot: a cryptographic credential is checked in milliseconds regardless of how good the forgery is, and it fails *safe* — an unsigned artifact earns not censorship but a calibrated shrug. The question "can we spot every fake?" has no good answer. The question "can honest actors prove what they published?" does.

03

The trust stack: four layers of defense

No single mechanism — not provenance, not moderation, not fact-checking, not media literacy — survives contact with the problem alone. Epistemic security, like every other security, is defense in depth. This chapter names the layers and what each owes the others.

FAIR Labs organizes the defense as a four-layer **trust stack** (Exhibit 9.2). The metaphor is engineered infrastructure, and it is meant literally: like a water system, the stack works when each stage assumes the others leak. **Provenance rails** at the foundation attach verifiable origin signals to content at creation and carry them through editing and distribution. **Platforms and intermediaries** — social feeds, search, messaging, app stores — decide what signals users actually see, and whether synthetic floods find amplification. **Professional verifiers** — press, science, statistics agencies, courts, archives — do the expensive checking that cannot be automated and stake institutional reputation on the result. And the **literate public** supplies the norms that make the other layers matter: expecting credentials, reading laterally, pausing before sharing.

EXHIBIT 9.2 • CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The trust stack: each layer covers the failures of the others

content flows up • trust signals accumulate

LAYER 4 • THE LITERATE PUBLIC

fails by: fatigue • cynicism • overload

norms that travel: verify-then-share, read laterally, expect credentials

LAYER 3 • PROFESSIONAL VERIFIERS

fails by: capture • defunding • speed mismatch

Press, science, statistics, courts — paid to check, staked on being right

LAYER 2 • PLATFORMS & INTERMEDIARIES

fails by: engagement optimization • inconsistency

surface credentials; damp synthetic amplification; label absence

LAYER 1 • PROVENANCE RAILS


fails by: stripping • analog hole • thin adoption

cryptographic origin signals that travel with content

FAIR Labs framework. The stack is deliberately redundant: provenance covers what moderation misses; professional verification covers what provenance cannot attest (truth of content, not just origin); public norms cover the residual. A layer's failure modes, listed at right, define the layer above's job description.

Two properties of the stack deserve emphasis. First, **the layers verify different things**. Provenance attests origin and edit history — *who made this, with what, and what changed* — but says nothing about whether the content is true. Professional verifiers attest claims. The public attests, in aggregate, what circulates. Confusing these — treating a signed artifact as a true one, or an unsigned one as false — is the most common design error in current proposals. Second, **the stack redistributes labor**. Today the burden of authenticity-checking lands overwhelmingly on the least equipped party: the individual, at the moment of scrolling. A built stack moves most of that burden into rails and institutions that check once, automatically, for everyone (Exhibit 9.3) — the same migration every mature infrastructure made. Nobody boils their own drinking water; nobody should hand-forensicate their own news feed.

EXHIBIT 9.3 • CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Where the everyday verification burden lands — now, and with the stack built

Share of the everyday authenticity-checking burden (conceptual)

■ Individuals ■ Platforms ■ Professional verifiers ■ Provenance rails (automatic)

Conceptual allocation, not a measurement: the shares express the report's design intent — shifting routine authenticity checks off individuals and onto automatic rails and resourced institutions, reserving human attention for the judgments only humans can make.

A civilization that asks every citizen to be their own forensic analyst will get neither forensics nor citizenship. The point of infrastructure is that vigilance becomes a property of the system, not a daily tax on every person in it.

THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF THIS REPORT

04

Provenance rails — and their honest limits


The foundation layer is the most buildable: open standards for content credentials already exist, camera and software vendors have begun shipping them, and the cryptography is boring in the best sense. What remains is adoption — and honesty about what provenance cannot do.

Three mechanisms make up the rails. **Content credentials** bind a tamper-evident manifest to a media file: who created it, with what tool, and the chain of edits since — verifiable by anyone, offline, in milliseconds. **Cryptographic signing** lets institutions publish under keys they control, so a press release, a statistical series, or an official video can be checked against the publisher rather than taken on the platform's word. **Capture-time attestation** moves the anchor into hardware: a camera's secure element signs the sensor output at the moment of exposure, before software touches it — the strongest claim available that photons, not prompts, produced an image.

The rails' promise is not that fakes become impossible. It is that *honest content becomes cheap to authenticate*, which flips the scissors of Exhibit 9.1: verification drops to machine cost for everything signed, and human scrutiny concentrates on the shrinking unsigned residue. Past a critical mass of adoption, absence becomes informative — "no credentials" reads the way "no ingredients label" reads on food. Exhibit 9.4 sketches how differently that critical mass arrives under three coordination regimes; the lesson is that procurement and device defaults, not exhortation, are what bend the curve.

EXHIBIT 9.4 • SCENARIO CONSTRUCT

Provenance adoption under three coordination regimes



FAIR Labs scenario construct — illustrative trajectories, not forecasts. "Coordinated" assumes credential support becomes a default in capture devices, creative tools, and platform display, pulled by public-procurement requirements. The threshold line marks the report's qualitative judgment of where non-participation itself becomes a useful signal.

WHAT PROVENANCE CANNOT DO

Four limits, stated plainly. **The analog hole:** re-photographing a screen launders any file clean of its history; capture-time attestation narrows this but cannot close it. **Stripping:** credentials can be removed — the defense is platforms treating absence as a visible fact, not rails pretending removal is impossible. **Origin is not truth:** a signed artifact can lie; provenance authenticates the chain of custody, never the claim. **Privacy tension:** signing must not become mandatory identity — anonymous speech is a feature of free societies, and the standards must keep pseudonymous and unsigned publication survivable. Provenance is a floor, not a verdict.

"Provenance by default" is therefore a specific, finite program: credentials on by default in cameras, phones, and creative software, including AI generators labeling their own output; preservation of manifests through the editing and hosting chain; display surfaces in feeds and search that make checking one tap, not one investigation; and public-sector procurement that requires the whole path — the same demand-side lever Volume 01 recommends for model assurance (FA-06), aimed here at the information supply chain. None of it requires new science. All of it requires the coordination that Exhibit 9.4's top curve assumes — which is to say, it requires deciding to.

05

The human layers: institutions and the literate public

Rails carry signals; humans decide what they mean. The stack's upper layers — the institutions that vouch and the public that judges — cannot be engineered into existence, but they can be resourced, redesigned, and treated with the seriousness the moment demands.

5.1 Institutions that vouch

In a synthetic-media environment, the scarce commodity is no longer information — it is *vouching*: an accountable party staking its name on a claim. That scarcity is the professional verifiers' opportunity, and it arrives exactly when many of them are weakest — newsroom economics hollowed out, statistical agencies budget-squeezed, science midway through its own replication reckoning, courts confronting evidence whose authenticity juries can no longer eyeball. Exhibit 9.5 assigns each institution its new duties. The pattern across rows is the same: sign what you publish, show your work, build the authenticated channel before the crisis that makes you wish you had.

EXHIBIT 9.5 • CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

New duties for the vouching institutions — and how far along they are

INSTITUTION	NEW DUTY IN THE SYNTHETIC ERA	THE OPPORTUNITY	POSTURE
Newsrooms & press agencies	Sign published media end-to-end; publish verification methods, not just verdicts; maintain rapid-response forensics desks.	Provenance becomes a competitive product — "we can prove it" is a subscription argument.	Moving
Statistics agencies	Cryptographically signed data series with immutable revision histories; machine-readable by default.	Becoming the reference layer other claims are checked against.	Pilots
Science & universities	Provenance for datasets and figures; disclosure norms for AI-assisted work; faster public correction loops.	Rebuilding credibility on visible process rather than asserted authority.	Uneven
Courts & evidence law	Authentication standards for digital exhibits; qualified forensic examiners; jury guidance for the deepfake defense.	Denying the liar's dividend a courtroom foothold.	Early
Libraries & archives	Preserve provenanced originals; serve as neutral custodians of record when platforms and publishers vanish.	The civic memory layer — boring, priceless.	Under-resourced
Election administrators	Authenticated channels for ballots, results, and official communications, rehearsed before election week.	The single highest-stakes use of the whole stack.	Urgent

FAIR Labs framework. "Posture" pills are the report's qualitative reading of aggregate progress across advanced democracies, for orientation rather than measurement; individual institutions vary widely.

One institutional duty deserves its own sentence: **the boring, reliable public number**. Inflation series, health statistics, court records, election tallies — these are the reference points that let strangers argue productively. They are cheap to fund, slow to rebuild, and irreplaceable once doubted. A society that lets its statistical infrastructure decay is disarming unilaterally in the epistemic conflict this report describes.

5.2 The literate public

The top layer is the one no government can install: a public with working epistemic reflexes. The evidence-informed approach is **inoculation** — exposing people to weakened doses of manipulation techniques, with the trick explained, before they meet the live pathogen. Inoculation respects its audience: it does not tell people *what* to believe; it shows them *how* belief gets manufactured, and lets recognition do the rest. A small set of norms carries most of the value, and they are teachable from classroom to newsroom:

- **Verify, then share** — the pause is the intervention; virality is the attacker's logistics.
- **Read laterally** — judge a source by what the rest of the web says about it, not by how its own pages look.
- **Expect credentials** — treat provenance the way one treats ingredient labels: absence is information.
- **Mind the emotion spike** — content engineered to enrage is engineered; strong feeling is a flag, not a verdict.

The design principle underneath is **dignity**. Programs that treat the public as a contamination risk to be managed — filtered, nudged, shielded from wrongthink — breed exactly the resentment and conspiracy the programs feared, and hand the doubter's trap its recruits. The literate-public agenda bets the other way: that people handed good tools, honest institutions, and respect will mostly use them. That bet is not naive; it is the only one with a working precedent — it is how every previous media shock was eventually absorbed.

*A public treated as incapable of judgment will eventually oblige.
The literate public is not a prerequisite for the trust stack — it is
what the trust stack, built with dignity, produces.*

CHAPTER 5, ON DESIGNING FOR CAPABILITY

06

The FAIR agenda for trust: eight moves

Eight recommendations, each with a named owner. The sequence is deliberate: rails first, because they change the economics; institutions next, because they hold the load; the public throughout, because norms are the slowest infrastructure to build.

TR-01 **Make provenance the default, not the feature**

Content credentials on by default in cameras, phones, creative suites, and AI generators; manifests preserved through hosting chains; open standards, no single-vendor lock.

OWNERS: [STANDARDS BODIES](#) · [DEVICE & SOFTWARE MAKERS](#) · [PLATFORMS](#) · DEEP DIVE: §4

TR-02 **Authenticate the civic channels first**

Signed, verifiable publication for statistics, court records, election results, and emergency communications — rehearsed under adversarial conditions before the crisis, not during it.

OWNERS: [STATISTICS AGENCIES](#) · [ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS](#) · [GOVERNMENTS](#) · SEE ALSO: VOL 04

TR-03 **Move the burden off the scroll**

Platform duties: display credentials at a glance, label absence, damp amplification of unprovenanced synthetic media in civic contexts, and publish transparency metrics on all three.

OWNERS: [PLATFORMS](#) · [PLATFORM REGULATORS](#) · DEEP DIVE: §3

TR-04 **Fund the verification bench**

Shared forensic tooling, OSINT commons, and rapid-response capacity that small newsrooms and civil-society groups can draw on — verification as a public utility, not a luxury of scale.

OWNERS: [PHILANTHROPIES](#) · [NEWSROOMS](#) · [UNIVERSITIES](#)

TR-05 Teach inoculation, not censorship

Epistemic literacy in core curricula — manipulation mechanics, lateral reading, provenance checking — designed to build capability and measured by behavior, not by opinions held.

OWNERS: [EDUCATION MINISTRIES](#) · [EDUCATORS](#) · [PUBLIC BROADCASTERS](#) · DEEP DIVE: §5.2

TR-06 Guard the boring numbers

Statutory independence and multi-year funding for statistical agencies and public registries — the reference layer every other verification ultimately leans on.

OWNERS: [LEGISLATURES](#) · [STATISTICS AGENCIES](#) · SEE ALSO: VOL 02 ON MEASUREMENT

TR-07 Enlist AI on defense

The same systems that fabricate can triage forensics, trace claim lineages, and draft context at platform speed — deployed with published error rates and human sign-off, per Volume 06's authority rules.

OWNERS: [PLATFORMS](#) · [NEWSROOMS](#) · [AI DEVELOPERS](#) · SEE ALSO: VOLS 01, 06

TR-08 Measure the commons like an environment

A standing epistemic-health observatory: provenance coverage, verification latency, liar's- dividend incidents, trust surveys — published annually, so this agenda can be marked to reality.

OWNERS: [PHILANTHROPIES](#) · [UNIVERSITIES](#) · [CIVIL SOCIETY](#) · SEE ALSO: VOL 03

A closing note on proportion. Nothing here requires new censorship powers, and the agenda is deliberately survivable by unsigned and anonymous speech — the point is to make honesty cheap to prove, not to make speech expensive to attempt. That design choice is strategic as well as principled: a trust infrastructure that doubles as a control infrastructure will be distrusted precisely by the citizens it most needs to convince, and will deserve to be.

07

Reader's toolkit: the vocabulary of epistemic security

Twelve terms, defined the way this report uses them. Half the policy confusion in this field is vocabulary confusion; this page is the antidote.

Epistemic security

A society's resilience in forming shared, accurate beliefs under adversarial conditions — the umbrella goal of this volume.

Synthetic media

Content generated or substantially altered by AI systems — text, image, audio, or video — regardless of intent; synthesis is a property, not a verdict.

Provenance

The verifiable record of a content item's origin and edit history — who made it, with what tools, and what changed since capture.

Content credentials

Tamper-evident manifests bound to media files carrying provenance data, checkable by anyone without contacting the publisher.

Capture-time attestation

Hardware-level signing of sensor output at the moment of recording — the strongest available claim that a camera, not a model, produced an image.

The analog hole

The permanent limit of provenance: re-recording content (filming a screen, re-scanning a print) strips its history and cannot be fully prevented.

Liar's dividend

The benefit dishonest actors reap from the mere existence of convincing fakes: authentic evidence becomes deniable — "that could be AI."

Doubter's trap

The collapse of universal skepticism into tribal credulity: unable to verify anything, people default to believing their side and dismissing the other.

Trust stack

This report's four-layer architecture — provenance rails, platforms, professional verifiers, literate public — engineered as defense in depth.

Authenticated channel

A publication path whose outputs are cryptographically checkable against the issuing institution — the civic priority use of the rails.

Epistemic literacy

The trained reflexes of verification — lateral reading, provenance checking, verify-then-share — built by inoculation rather than instruction in what to believe.

Verification burden

The total labor of authenticity-checking and where it lands; the stack's purpose is moving it from individuals to infrastructure.

WHERE TO GO NEXT IN THE SERIES

The information commons is one system among several this series treats as critical infrastructure: Volume 06 covers the operational kind, Volume 03 maps the full risk landscape, and Volume 04 designs the governance machinery many of this volume's recommendations plug into. Educators and civil-society readers pairing trust with the labor transition should read Volume 08; communicators tracing the economics of attention and abundance, Volume 02. One shared evidence base, ten vantage points.



Fair Artificial Intelligence Research Labs (FAIR Labs) is an independent research institute working to ensure that advanced artificial intelligence is developed safely, governed wisely, and shared fairly. Through rigorous technical research, policy analysis, and public engagement, FAIR Labs works with scientists, governments, companies, and communities to widen the circle of people who benefit from — and have a say in — the most consequential technology of our time.

The **Frontier Series** is FAIR Labs' flagship collection of stakeholder briefings on advanced AI — one shared evidence base, ten vantage points. Each volume stands alone; together they form a common map for scientists, executives, policymakers, workers, and citizens navigating the same transition.

VOL 01 · The Safety Horizon

VOL 02 · The Abundance Dividend

VOL 03 · Atlas of AI Risk

VOL 04 · Governing the Frontier

VOL 05 · The Alignment Agenda

VOL 06 · When Systems Can't Fail

VOL 07 · The Compute Compact

VOL 08 · Work in the Age of Cognition

VOL 09 · The Trust Infrastructure

VOL 10 · The Director's Dilemma